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INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial application of United States law has been an irritant in United States relationships with its allies and other trading partners since World War II. Other governments have regularly voiced objections in principle to assertions by United States courts, government officials or commentators that the norms of United States regulatory legislation govern events or persons located abroad.' The sharpest confrontations and the ones with the greatest potential for disrupting amicable political and economic relations, however, occur when the United States seeks to use its power over persons or entities before its courts or agencies to enforce its policies by requiring or prohibiting acts or omissions abroad that are contrary to the laws or policies of the foreign territorial sovereign.2 issues of extraterritoriality are of special importance because United States courts and scholars are engaged in on-going efforts to revise and refine the manner in which standards guiding jurisdictional assertions under United States law are being articulated.4
My thesis is simply stated. The development of processes to resolve conflicting claims of authority to forbid or require conduct within a nation's borders is most appropriately carried out by diplomatic exchange, not by judicial decisions in which a forum balances its own interest against the competing interests of other states. A trend toward the development of such processes may be getting underway. Careful nurturing and encouragement of this approach will fairs Committee voted on 10 August to rescind the U.S. sanctions. Western European leaders formally protested the sanctions on 12 August. On 23 August the French government requisitioned equipment that was earmarked for the pipeline from Dresser, France, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dallas-based Dresser Industries, Inc. A federal district court denied Dresser Industries a temporary restraining order, citing lack of proof that the ban would cause harm. The U.S. imposed sanctions against Dresser, France, and a French government-owned engineering company. On 1 Sept., the U.S. government narrowed the scope of its sanctions in France to apply solely to purchases of U.S. oil and gas equipment. The danger of this characterization lies in the fact that when used in the context of adjudication by domestic courts, it suggests that these decisionmakers are selecting between applicable laws. Rather, each such adjudicator is determining whether the law of his own jurisdiction is applicable, not whether to apply the regulatory system of some foreign nation. See Maier, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection between Public and Private International Law," 76 Am. J. Int. L. 280, 290 (1982) . Thus, the jurisdictional system correctly contains the theoretical possibility that some private activities may be beyond the regulation of any state-but these would necessarily be activities that have no significant impact on the interests of any state. serve the needs of the international system to resolve such conflicts with emphasis on coordinating competing interests in a climate of international cooperation, not on unilateral resolutions enabled by coercive local power. More important, it will contribute to the development of a community consensus by means of international dialogue on jurisdictional restraints that will further facilitate the flow of transnational commerce.
INTEREST BALANCING IN THE DIPLOMATIC FORUM
Three characterizations describe the overlapping jurisdictional considerations involved in determining the legal legitimacy of applying the social policies of a nation to events or persons outside its borders: jurisdiction to adjudicate, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce.5 Assertion of jurisdiction by United States courts to adjudicate claims based on activities of foreign persons carried out abroad usually engenders only the lowest level of foreign concern, primarily because the standards of due process and equal protection in this country require that the exercise of such jurisdiction not be so unfair as to violate minimum fairness standards.6 The assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law applying to foreign events or persons runs a greater risk of interference with foreign sovereign interests because such assertions by a nation with the vast commercial influence of the United States has a coercive effect on acts abroad by persons or enterprises who might believe themselves likely later to become subject to judicial jurisdiction in United States courts.7 Ordinary prudence argues that the United States standard should be observed by persons or entities having commercial relations in this country, regardless of the validity of the ? 401. Categories of Jurisdiction Defined. As used in this Restatement:
(1) "Jurisdiction to prescribe" means authority of a state to apply its law to the conduct, relations, status or interests of persons, or to things, by legislation, executive act or order, administrative rule or regulation or judgment of a court, whether in general or in particular cases.
(2) "Jurisdiction to enforce" means the exercise by a state of authority to compel or induce compliance, to reward compliance or to impose sanctions for noncompliance, with statutes, rules, orders, regulations, or judgments, whether through judicial proceedings or otherwise. Resolution of the pipeline dispute reflected not only the balancing of competing interests that occurred as part of each nation's internal decision-making processes14 but also that weighing of the relative interests of each nation against those of others that is inherent in the dispute resolution process in the international forum. This interest balancing in the formulation of reliable international jurisdictional rules in the diplomatic forum contrasts with that other "balancing of interests" that has been alluded to by United States courtsl5 and by some scholars'6 to describe an appropriate mode for judicial resolution of extraterritorial jurisdictional conflicts in United States domestic forums.
In the diplomatic forum, the label "balancing of interests" merely characterizes the ordinary international law formation process of demand, response and eventual accommodation in the light of reciprocal national needs and tolerances.17 The rules of international law describe community expectations that result from this process.'8 Jurisdictional rules are fundamental because they describe community expectations about the reach of sovereign power. Therefore, these jurisdictional rules especially must reflect community interests. If they do not, jurisdictional principles become instruments of anarchy, not of order, and lose their utility as organizing principles for transnational conduct.
It is for this reason that the territorial principle of jurisdiction and its variations continues to serve as the benchmark against which other jurisdictional principles are weighed.19 The principle serves both to limit state authority and to distribute competence among political units.20 In this latter role, it enables the regulation of transnational activities by states in a system built on the funda- mental premise that a state's bona fide territorial interests will be recognized as legitimate by the other members of the international community.21 This mutual recognition of legitimacy is a central element of the principle of comity and validates the exercise of state power.22 By characterizing the fundamental parameters of state responsibility, the territorial principle enables the process of reciprocal claim and mutual tolerance that is essential to the functioning of the system.23 The reciprocal nature of this claim and response process is the functional limit upon the exercise of state power. Therefore, any accurate description of that limit must include reference to a community dynamic. Neither fixed rules nor superficial comparisons of the relative local law interests of a small number of states in contention about a specific assertion of jurisdictional competence will suffice. Thus, the long-term interests of all nation states in preserving and developing an effective system must necessarily be foremost among the interests that energize diplomatic resolution of jurisdictional conflicts to create precedent compatible with an orderly resolution of future competing jurisdictional claims as well.24 Both interests in attaining short term benefits and interests in having a system that permits effective future accommodation of competing national claims with a minimum of confrontation and a maximum of flexibility are necessarily influential.25
In the pipeline situation, for example, a successful assertion of authority to act as it did by the United States would have seriously injured the reliability of the international jurisdictional system and, thus, have created a never-never land for transnational transactions. Ultimately, the countervailing pressures generated by the confrontation between the United States and its European allies made it clear that all parties had a greater interest in a system that would lend support to the reliability of transnational contracts and reaffirm the authority and responsibility of sovereign states to plot their own making process in which the court identifies the interests of the countries having contact with the situation to be adjudicated, weighs each country's interest in having its law applied against that of the others, and makes the choice of law decision according to the turn of the scales. Since in these two cases the principal issue was jurisdiction to prescribe, not jurisdiction to enforce, neither court actually carried out the balancing of interests that it mandated. Each remanded to the district court for further proceedings according to the appellate opinion.41 These cases, together with authority from the domestic conflict of laws field, represent the principal judicial support for the interest balancing approach to resolve international jurisdictional issues adopted in Sec. 403 of Tentative Draft No. 2 of the revision of the foreign relations law restatement42 currently underway. They are cited by other courts43 and commentators44 to establish the legitimacy of judicial "interest balancing" in extraterritorial jurisdiction cases.
The concept of "interest balancing" is directly related to the concept of comity.45 Comity, in turn, refers both to legal policies that energize the rules of conflict of laws and to considerations of high international politics concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations.46 Thus, the term "interest balancing" includes not only references that are meaningful in the context of the analytical jurisprudence of choice of law but has strong political implications as well.47 The remainder of this article 41. At this writing, the Timberlane case is still in the discovery stage after remand. In Mannington Mills, after remand the defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the interest of the United States was so insignificant when compared to that of each of the other 26 countries involved that no further balancing was required. After the district court denied this motion, the case was settled. Settlement was apparently encouraged in part by the difficulty involved in gathering and submitting facts sufficient to permit effective balancing of the interests of each of the other countries against those of the United States. Cf. Shenefeld, supra n. 14 at 55,964. addresses only the first element-the utility of judicial "interest balancing" as an analytical tool to enable decisions that will effectively coordinate the relevant substantive policies of nation-states and thus contribute to the development of a workable and reliable transnational jurisdictional system.48
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
The adoption of the term "interest balancing" to describe the touchstone of legal analysis in these cases is unfortunate. In the domestic judicial forum the concept implies an unwarranted flexibility that encourages "reasonableness" as a substitute for analysis and leads to the assertion of the primacy of United States interests in the guise of applying an international jurisdictional rule of reason49 without identification of the policies to whose achievement that reasonableness should be directed.50 In cases such as Timberlane and Mannington Mills which deal with jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law to apply to foreign-based events, the interest balancing process principally involves identifying the interests that the appellate court believes should be considered, leaving for further consideration in the light of additional evidence the extent to which one nation's interests can be said to outweigh the other's. Although those cases involving enforcement jurisdiction in which the resolution of a direct clash of national interests is required use the balancing rubric, they either give foreign national interests short shrift or ignore them completely. Some recent cases are illustrative.
In Italiana.53 In that case the SEC sought information about the identities of principals for whom the Swiss bank had acted in a stock purchase deal in which the SEC suspected insider trading. The court asserted that its decision to require disclosure resulted from a careful balancing of the governmental interests at stake as well as consideration of other factors. In fact, the court's analysis of governmental interests amounted principally to pointing out that the United States securities laws were important, that bank secrecy made it difficult to enforce them and that the Swiss government had not objected to the court's ordering disclosure except to point out that disclosure without permission of the bank's clients would open the bank to criminal prosecution.54 A third illustration is United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia.55 In this case a Canadian bank refused to submit documents subpoened for a grand jury investigation of alleged narcotics and tax law violations on the grounds that the Bahamian bank secrecy laws prohibited the branch that held the documents from releasing them. The court of appeals ordered disclosure on the grounds that the United States' interest in disclosure was greater than the Bahamian interest in preventing it. In arriving at this conclusion, the court made no effort even to identify the competing policies represented by the disclosure order on the one hand and the bank secrecy requirement on the other. It found the Bahamian interest weak because the Bahamians would permit disclosure for their own local law purposes, but not for use in foreign tax investigations. It was most significant that the court made it clear that the Bahamian law interfered with the United States need to enforce its own legal requirements and therefore would not be given effect.
These cases are unsatisfactory for at least three reasons. First, the courts focus on the national interests reflected in the local laws in conflict, ignoring internal systemic interests that more accurately reflect the relationship between the authority claimed by the nations involved and their ability to function as responsible and independent sovereigns for municipal purposes. necessary for it to do justice in its courts and the interest of the foreign nation in being able to provide reliable guarantees of confidentiality to encourage beneficial local economic activity.56 Instead, the court compares the United States interest in collecting taxes or implementing its securities laws with the foreign interest in maintaining secret bank accounts and, not surprisingly, concludes that United States interests are superior. This narrow focus on local law subject matter policies rather than on the relationship between possessing the authority asserted and the ability of each claiming sovereign to meet both its domestic and international social obligations necessarily encourages a myopic view focused on parochial considerations.57
The courts' emphasis should clearly be on finding the "natural" assignments of competence that are discoverable from the implications of a system based on territorially divided power, not on casespecific analyses attempting to weigh, for example, the apples of taxation against the oranges of bank secrecy to determine which is somehow more important to the governments whose laws assert these interests. As one writer puts it, this kind of balancing in effect requires a court "to choose between being unpatriotic or disingenuous."58 In each of these cases, the court chose the latter.
A comparison of these illustrations with the Tenth Circuit's decisions in In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contracts Litigation59 is instructive. In that case, Westinghouse sought documents from Rio Algom, a Canadian corporation, to support its allegation that the price of uranium had been artificially raised by the activities of an international uranium cartel. The Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations made it a crime to produce these documents or to testify about their contents and a Canadian court had so held when it refused Westinghouse's earlier efforts to have the material produced by means of letters rogatory. The court of appeals reversed the district court's contempt citation against Rio Algom for refusing to produce the documents. After finding that Rio Algom's efforts to procure a waiver from the Canadian government were not shown to be in bad faith, the circuit court concluded that the Canadian "national interest in controlling and supervising atomic energy"60 was superior in this case to the United States interest in providing adequate discovery for litigants in its courts since the evidence sought was to a degree cumulative.61 Thus, although in this case the Canadian interests are identified, they appear to be given effect principally because they reflect policies that meet with the approval of the U.S. forum. The result flows not from a true balancing of conflicting governmental interests but from an evaluation of the substance of the conflicting policies. Taken together, the thrust of these cases is that we will respect those foreign laws and policies whose purposes we approve, but not those that we dislike. This is hardly a useful policy on which to base the development of an effective transnational system. It amounts, in effect, to applying the universality principle without universality. The courts made no effort to determine whether the conduct in question is, or even should be, universally condemned in the interests of the international community.62 Judicial approval or disapproval of the foreign national policies in question was the determining factor. The second difficulty with these cases is their failure to assess the utility of the jurisdictional assertion that the court approves in the context of the jurisdictional competences and limitations that will best contribute to maintaining an international system reflecting divisions of authority appropriate to long term community interests. This difficulty is to a great degree inherent in any municipal decision-making process that purports to require objective balancing of the forum's local law interests against those of a foreign nation. tent, not because they reflect considerations that are viewed as being independently important.64 The Constitution is the legitimizer of the municipal process. As long as the court fulfills its constitutional role, its decisions are by definition municipally legitimate. These courts do not seem to understand that their decisions are functional components of the international decision-making system nor that the international legitimacy of these decisions depends upon the degree to which they address systemic needs. In none of these cases does the court address the wisdom of a jurisdictional rule permitting the enforcement of one nation's social policies inside the territory of another contrary to that territorial sovereign's wishes in light of the impact that its selected jurisdictional rule would have if adopted in the international community generally.
The court, unlike the diplomat, will not have to confront a foreign counterpart of equal status in a later negotiation and have to live with the results of its current decision. At worst, it may have to distinguish the case. Therefore, unlike the decisionmaker-advocates in the diplomatic forum, the court is not faced with that immediacy inherent in deciding one's own future fate. In the domestic judicial forum, it is never the institutional interest of the decision-maker that is being balanced in any immediate sense when it applies the jurisdictional rule. Where a United States societal interest is involved, it is likely that courts will protect that interest by ruling in favor of the applicability of United States law, leaving it to the diplomatic forum to work out any difficulties that might arise in connection with the impact of the decision on the international legal system. In other words, the United States interest in contributing to an effective international system is not treated as one of the interests to be balanced in these cases to determine whether jurisdiction may be legitimately exercised.65
Lastly, these decisions, by purporting to apply principles of international law while in fact arriving at results based primarily on judicial evaluations of short term local law goals, weaken rather than strengthen the international system. Whenever one sovereign attempts to coerce or require activities inside the borders of another that conflict with the foreign sovereign's local law policies it interferes with that nation's interest in controlling and guiding its own affairs.66 Decisions by national courts that purport to recognize foreign governmental interests while in fact adopting a parochial analysis do a greater disservice to the international system than would a The court of appeals in Marc Rich and Co. v. U.S., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983), ignored interest balancing entirely, primarily on the grounds that judicial jurisdiction over the parties in a grand jury investigation created all the connection necessary to permit the court to order enforcement of a subpoena to produce foreign-located documents by a contempt citation. In that case Marc Rich, A.G., a Swiss corporation, did business in the United States through Marc Rich International, its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary. In a proceeding before the grand jury in the grand jury in the Southern District of New York to investigate charges of criminal tax fraud, the district court subpoened documents located in Switzerland and denied Marc Rich A.G.'s motion to quash the subpoena. The court found both that it had personal jurisdiction over Marc Rich, A.G. and that United States interest in tax enforcement was greater than the Swiss interest in preventing disclosure of business documents under Art. 273 of the Swiss Civil Code. When the defendant still did not produce the documents in question, the court found it in civil contempt. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the finding that personal jurisdiction existed and omitted any discussion of the relative interests of the U.S. and Switzerland. The court reasoned that since the crime and the parties being investigated are subject to the jurisdiction of the grand jury and the court, the evidence also is subject to that jurisdiction. Thus, the court could enforce an order for production of foreign situs evidence for use by the grand jury. 707 F.2d at 667. The court concluded that a nexus sufficient to create jurisdiction over the Swiss corporation automatically evidenced a U.S. interest sufficient to permit enforcement of the subpoena. The Supreme Court denied certiorari after a motion for expedited review. In August 1983, Swiss prosecutors seized the documents that were remaining in Switzerland to be held pending further negotiations. sovereign rights of necessity weakens the sources of responsibility in the international community and thus weakens the community itself since reliable community expectations can only develop in circumstances that permit fixing responsibility for meeting them. Due regard for this benefit of territorial sovereignty is essential in developing all jurisdictional rules.
I am not suggesting that United States courts should abdicate adjudication entirely when dealing with these cases. Rather, in those instances where a direct clash of sovereign policies and assertion of United States enforcement jurisdiction will inevitably lead to requiring acts contrary to the legitimate wishes of a foreign sovereign in its own territory, United States courts should indulge the strong presumption that international law and, thus, the law of the United States does not permit such interference. This is the thrust of Sec. prescriptive jurisdiction over the original cause of action in pursuit of which discovery was being sought had not yet been established. The court did not engage in any effort separately to "balance" the interests of France and the United States in the outcome of the issue, either under the rubric of judicial deference or to determine if jurisdiction existed. Rather, it rested its decision squarely on its own analysis of international law and principles of territorial sovereignty, concluding that the method of service violated international law and that the statutes allegedly authorizing the attempted service could not have been intended to permit such a violation. An analytical approach that identifies and seeks to implement policies important to the international system provides the most effective support for the creation of a jurisdictional system that will reflect an appropriate compromise of national interests in the light of the self-interest of all nations in an effectively functioning international community. Greater certainty in international contracts and a system that reliably fixes both power and responsibility on territorial premises are only two of the benefits that will flow from such an arrangement.73 What appears to be a developing trend in the executive branch to attempt to resolve issues of this kind in advance by means of international agreement or at least on the basis of prior communication74 is far preferable to leaving the interest balancing that is essential to any generally acceptable solution to the judicial forum. Continuing work on international agreements to address these issues is of considerable utility. One important effect will be the relieving of United States courts from a task that they are ill-equipped to carry out and that they have not, in most instances, effectively undertaken. 
